National Law School Journal
Volume 1

Issue 1

Article 9

1-7-1989

Great controversies and legal cases: Old and not so old
Anil B. Divan

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj

Recommended Citation
Divan, Anil B. (1989) "Great controversies and legal cases: Old and not so old," National Law School
Journal: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 9.
Available at: https://repository.nls.ac.in/nlsj/vol1/iss1/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in National Law School Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact library@nls.ac.in.

(1989) 1 NLSJ 109

Great controversies and great cases:
Old and not so old
ANIL B. DIY AN

1. Introduction
To enrich one's mind with historic and heroic struggles and great controversies
concerning the law in or outside the law courts is a rewarding pursuit. It gives
meaning and insight to our concept of civil liberties, human rights and the
independence of the judiciary.
Some of the struggles and cases I am goiOg to recount in this article show the
vicissitudes and difficulty with which the great rights and liberties were won. The
independence
of the judiciary in England was won due to the courage and
determination of judges, parliamentarians and citizens. In this small contribution I
have described the struggles and cases which have profoundly impressed me and
which serve as a perennial source of inspiration for the judge and the lawyer.

2. The independence

of the judiciary:

The American experiment

Most constitutions of the world are written being inspired by the success of the
American example. They contain a Bill of Rights and remedies to enforce them
through a higher judiciary. The tenure of the judiciary is till life or superannuation and
is irremovable at the instance of the Government or the executive. This independence
was the great achievement of the English Parliament and judges. But the reason for it
is found in the deliberations preceding the framing of the American Constitution.
The American colonists while framing their Constitution were greatly under the
influence of Sir Edward Coke, the great Chief Justice of the King's Bench. The
immigrants had come from England where there was religious persecution. The
decision of Coke holding (in Dr. Bonham's case) that the common law of England
would even control and nullify Acts of Parliament, influenced the founding fathers of
the American Constitution. This decision of Coke contained the seed of the concept
of Judicial Review.
The United States Constitution ensures the independence of the higher judiciary
by making their appointments for life. The judges are only removable by a long and
cumbersome procedure of impeachment before the Legislature.
Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78 has this to say about the independence
of the courts:
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"The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a
limited Constitution ... without this all the reservations and particular rights or
privileges would amount to nothing."
"If the courts of justice are to be considered as bulwarks of a limited Constitution
against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure. of judicial offices, since nothing will
contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges, which must be
essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a dUly."

3. The English heritage: The struggle for independent judges
The early history of the independence of the judiciary starts in Stuart England.
The English Kings claimed the "Divine Right of Kings" as emanating from God. The
judges according to them were the King's Judges supposed to do the bidding of the
King in the King's Courts. Instead of the King himself sitting in the seat of Justice and
dispensing justice, he had appointed judges who would officiate for him. If a King
could appoint, he could remove. Conflict developed between the English Parliament.
and the Stuart Kings who started making arbitrary demands in terms of money and
arrests of those who opposed these mea.sures or stood up for the rights of Parliament.
Over a period of time, the judiciary started to assert its independence.
The role of Sir Edward Coke, the Chief Justice in the fight for the independence
of judges against the King is epic in its dimensions.

James I and Sir Edward Coke
(1608 A.D.)
It is a cold wintry morning at Westminster Hall on November 30, 1608. James I
is bent on establishing the power of the Crown in absolute terms. In his way stand
Parliament and the Royal Law Courts. Under the leadership of Sir Edward Coke,
Chief Justice, the courts have been interfering in the matter of prerogative powers,
seizures and detentions and also issuing writs to review the decisions of the local,
feudal and ecclesiastical courts. On that historic day the King claimed that:
"Since the judges were but his delegates he could take any case he chose,
remove it from the jurisdiction of the courts and decide it in his royal
person."
To which it was answered by Chief Justice Coke:
"In the presence and with the clear consent of all the judges ... that the King
in his own cannot adjudge any case ... but that it ought to be determined and
adjudged in some court of justice, according to the law and customs of
England."
To this james replied:
"That he thought that the law was founded upon reason, and that he and
others had reason as well as the judges."
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Then followed the famous reply of Coke which sends a thrill of pride in every lawyer
and every judge after so many centuries. He said that:

•

"True it was that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent sense and
great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of
his realm of England and causes which concern the life or inheritance or
goods or fortunes of his subjects are not to be decided by natural reason but
by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which
requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the
cognizance of it; that the law was the golden metwand and measure to try the
causes of the subjects."

James was greatly offended and said:
"This means that I shall be under the law which is treason to affirm."
To which Coke replied:
"That Bracton saith that the King should not be under man but should be
under God and law."
In 1616 James I sent a Royal Order (issued by Sir Francis Bacon as Attorney
General) to Sir Edward Coke and his fellow judges not to proceed with the hearing of
an action because the King's prerogative was in question. The judges answered in a
letter:
"That they considered that order to be contrary to law and such as we could
not yield to the same by our oath."
When summoned by the King, the other judges retreated, bowed and humbled
themselves before the King and promised to do as the King desired. Chief Justice
Coke alone stood firm and replied:
"That when the case should be, he would do that should be fit for a judge
to do."
The indomitable courage of this answer inspires every Judge and lawyer to do his duty
according to law and not executive fiat.
As a result in 1616, Coke was dismissed from his position as Chief Justice of the
King's Bench. After his dismissal, the Court became merely the mouthpiece of the
King's will. (See Roots of Freedom: Bernard Schwartz pp 115-118)
In the reign of Charles I, the commissions of appointments of the judges were
changed from "appointments during good behaviour" to "appointments during the
King's good pleasure". The famous historian Henry Hallam sums it up in the
following words:
"The Courts of Justice did not consist of men consciously impartial between
the King and the subject. Some corrupt with the hope of promotion, many
more fearful of removal or awe-struck by the frowns of power."
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Charles I was tried and beheaded but after Oliver Cromwell and the Restoration
of Charles II followed the reign of James II. He was determined to restore absolute
royal power. He tried to repeal the Habeas Corpus Act. He utilised his power of
dismissal of judges to secure in the words of Holdsworth, "a packed bench of judges"
to establish the legality of his prerogative power.
The right between the Stuart Kings and Parliament ends in 1701 with the Act of
Settlement. The Act ensured that judges would not be appointed "till the King's
pleasure" as before, but were appointed "till good behaviour". The Commons in
England achieved this by the force of arms by beheading Charles I and later driving
away James II from the English throne.
It was only after the Glorious Revolution and the Act of Settlement that the
judges' tenure was firmly entrenched "for good behaviour" and made secure against
the royal power.

4. An Old Bombay case (1829)
An interesting case during British Rule in India shows the independence and
spirit of the English judge even in the colonies.
The Supreme Court of Bombay (predecessor of the High Court) was functioning
in the then Presidency Town of Bombay. Sir Edward West, as Chief Justice, was
sitting with two other judges, Sir Peter Grant and Justice Chambers. Two individuals
one Moro Raghunath and Bapu Ganesh were imprisoned, one in Poona and the other
in Thana, both outside the then territorial limits of the town of Bombay.
On an application, the court issued a writ of Habeas CO/pus and asked the
Government to file a return. The British Governor refused to obey the writs which
.were returned unexecuted. The court re-issued the writs. The executive refused to
obey. By this time, the Chief Justice had retired and gone to England and Justice
Chambers had died. Sir Peter Grant alone constituted the Bench.
On April 1, 1829 history was created. Sir Peter Grant declared that the Supreme
Court had ceased to function on all its sides and would remain closed until it received
an assurance that its authority would be respected and its process obeyed. He then
sailed for England. The matter was ultimately referred by the judges by a petition to
the Privy Council in England. The Privy Council decided that the Supreme Court had
no territorial jurisdiction to issue the writs and therefore, decided the question against
the judges on merits. The bold stand of Sir Peter Grant was a great show for the
independence of the judiciary. The principle that the executive could not sit in
judgment over the validity or correctness of the court's order and writs was forcefully
demonstrated by him, and his action vindicated the independence of the judiciary.
[The Privy Council decision is reported in 1 Knapp 1 (P.c.) = 12 ER 222. The Note at
p 243 at the end of the report describes the closure of the court referred to above]

5. The triumph of judicial review
The case of Malibwy v. Madison (2 LEd 60) is perhaps the most famous case in
American legal annals. It established firmly the principle of judicial review and the
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power of a constitutional court to invalidate law as being inconsistent
fundamental law, viz., the Constitution of the United States.
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The background and the facts make interesting reading and show that politicians
whether in eighteenth century America or twentieth century India will stop at nothing.
The year was 1800. Washington's party the Federalists' had been throughout in
power. John Adams was the Federalist President and John Marshall his Secretary of
State. The elections in 1800 knocked out the Federalists both from the Presidency and
the Congress. Thomas Jefferson was elected President and would take office in March
1801. The judiciary was the only refuge of the Federalists. President Adams appointed
John Marshall his Secretary of State as Chief Justice. Soon after his inauguration,
President Jefferson wrote that Federalists had "retreated into the judiciary as a
stronghold, the tenure of which renders it difficult to dislodge them".
President Adams had appointed 42 justices of the peace for the District of
Columbia. The lame-duck Senate hastily confirmed them. Adams, late on the last
night in office signed their commissions and rushed them by messenger to Marshall
still acting as Secretary to affix the great seal of the United States. In the event,
Marbury's Commission was lost in the hurry and confusion.
Later, Marbury applied directly to the Supreme Court seeking mandamus/or
issue of his commission as justice of the peace for the District of Columbia. The writ
was asked against the new Secretary of State, James Madison.
The court was in dilemma. If it ordered Madison to execute the Commission, he
would ignore the order with the support of President Jefferson who had termed the
appointments
as "midnight judges". If the court denied Marbury's right to his
commission the Jeffersoians would hail it as a victory. Marshall astutely side-stepped
and avoided an open clash and escaped from this dilemma. He held that Marbury had
a legal right to his commission; a writ of mandamus would lie to enforce his rights,
but the court had no jurisdiction to issue the writ. Because the provision of the Act of
Congress of 1789 empowering the Supreme Court to exercise original jurisdiction to
issue the writ was null and void because the Constitution having defined the Supreme
Couit's jurisdiction Congress had no power to change it, Marshall declared the law
void as being inconsistent with the supreme law of the Constitution and exercised
judicial review. He renounced a minor power to capture a major one,-a
great
accretion to the judicial power.
It is noteworthy that John Marshall, by common consent the greatest American
Chief Justice, was associated in the case both as Secretary of State and later as Chief
Justice. On modern norms he would have disqualified himself from the hearing.

6. Personal liberty
Liversidge v. Anderson [1941 (3) All ER 338]
This decision of the House of Lords has become famous because of the great
and forceful dissent of Lord Atkin in the House of Lords.
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During the Second World War Britain was threatened by a German invasion.
She had met with great reverses on the battlefield. France and most of Europe was
overrun by the German and the future looked bleak and depressing.
Under the Defence General Regulations it was provided by Regulation 18-B that
any person could be detained without trial if the Secretary of State has reasonable
cause to believe any person to be of hostile origin or association or to have been
recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the realm.
The person detained challenged the detention and required particulars of the grounds
on which "the Secretary of State had reasonable cause to believe ...." that it was
necessary to exercise control over the person detained.
The whole controversy was whether the opinion of the Secretary of State was
final or whether it was capable of being reviewed by the court and found reasonable.
The majority of the House of Lords held in favour of the Government.
Lord Atkin delivered a powerful dissenting speech which has become a classic on
the subject. Lord Atkin posed the question, whether the authority of the Minister to
detain without trial was final and the regulation should be interpreted to mean "if fhe
Secretary of State thinks that he has reasonable cause" (a view which found favour
with the majority) or whether the correct interpretation was "if the Secretary of State
has reasonable cause". The famous passage in Lord Atkin's judgment runs:
"In England amidst the clash of arms the laws are not silent. They may be
changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. It has always
been one of the pillars of freedom, one of the principles of liberty for which,
on recent authority, we are now fighting, that the judges are no respecters of
persons, and stand between the subject and any attempted encroachments on
his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in
law. In this case, I have listened to arguments which might have been
addressed acceptably to the Court of King's Bench in the time of Charles I.
I protest, even if I do it alone, against a strained construction put upon words,
with the effect of giving an uncontrolled power of imprisonment to the
Minister."
[1941 (3) All ER 338, at 361]
And he continued"I know of only one authority which might justify thc suggested
method of construction. "When 1 use a word", Humpty Dumpty said in
rather a scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean, neither
more nor less".
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different
things". "The question is" said Humpty Dumpty "which is to be master that's all". (Alice in Wonderland) After all this long discussion the question is
whether the words, "if a man has" can mean "If a man thinks he has". I am of
opiniun lhallhcy

cannot, and that the case shouid be decided accordingly."
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But apart from this celebrated passage what created great eontroversy and
offended his colleagues in the majority, were the following words:
"I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who, on a mere question of
constructicn, when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the
subject, show themselves more executive-minded than the executive."
The case was decided in November, 1941at a time when Britain was involved in a lifeand-death struggle with Germany.
But the sequel is more interesting for the budding law student and future
members of the Bar. Lord Simon, Lord Chancellor (who did not preside at the
hearing of the appeal) tried to persuade Lord Atkin before Atkin delivered his speech
in the House of Lords whether the amusing citation from Lewis Carol (Alice in
Wonderland) was necessary. Atkin did not agree to drop it.
Viscount Maugham who presided over the hearing in the House of Lords was so
enraged that he wrote a letter in the Times which was published on November 6, 1941
purporting to be in response to the Editorial of the Times. He stated in his letter:
"Lord Atkin, in his dissentient speech, stated that he had listened 'to
arguments which might have been addressed acceptably to the Court of
King's Bench in the time of Charles 1'. Counsel, according to the traditions of
the Bar, cannot reply even to so grave an admonition as this. I think it only
fair to the Attorney General and Mr. Valentine Holmes, who appeared for
the respondents, to say that 1 presided at the hearing and listened to every
word of their arguments, and that 1 did not hear from them, or anyone else,
anything which could justify such a remark."
This was unprecedented judicial behaviour by a former Lord Chancellor who
having delivered his judgment, sitting in his judicial 'capacity, went to the Press to
contradict his dissenting colleague. One judge attacking another judge in the Press
was unknown. Feelings were running high but Lord Atkin preserved complete silence.
However, Lord Maugham's letter met with universal disapproval with the Press.
But interestingly, a young barrister called Mr. Gerald Gardiner also wrote a
letter to the Times. Pointing out the history of the regulation when it was discussed in
the House of Commons, he highlighted the fact that it was amended because of
criticism. The words "if the Secretary of State has reasonable cause to believe" were
substituted for the words "if he was satisfied". He asked the question in his letter:
"What is one to think of an executive whose law officers now argue that the
amended Regulation means, and must have been intended to mean, precisely
the same as a regulation which was withdrawn."
.
The letter went on to say further "It may be presumptuous of an ordinary lawyer to
express a view upon the decision of the House of Lords, but as so distinguished a
lawyer as Lord Maugham has thought your columns an appropriate place in which to
comment upon part of the speech of another member of the tribunal, it may be
permissible for a humble member of the Bar to follow his example and to say that in
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places where lawyers meet the view being yesterday expressed by lawyers of all shades
of opinion was one of admiration for, and gratitude to, Lord Atkin for his dissenting
speech, the contents of which appear to some ordinary lawyers to be unanswerable."
It was reported that the Benchers of the Inn to which Mr. Gerald Gardiner
belonged considered taking disciplinary action against him for writing the letter, but
decided not to do so, on the basis that if an ex-Lord Chancellor writes a silly letter to
the Times he might expect a silly reply.
/
Mr. Gardiner, then a junior member of the Bar, ultimately became the Lord
Chancellor of England after a distinguished carrier. (See Geoffrey Lewis in his
Biography of Lord Atkin p. 148)
Subsequent generations have unanimously praised Atkin's dissent as being. the
correct law. The House· of Lords in IRe v. Ross Minster [1980 (1) All ER 80 at 104
(Lord Scarman)] ruled in favour of Atkin's view describing the majority decision as
"beyond recall" and commenting that its ghost need no longer haunt the law.

7. The privileges of the legislature:
judiciary

Fundamental rights and the

The u.P. Judges case (AIR 1965 SC 745)
Uttar Pradesh, as we -all know, is the largest State in terms of population.
It is said that if Uttar Pradesh becomes a separate nation, populationwise,
it
would perhaps rank fifth in the world after China, India, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R..
The High Court of U.P. has the largest number of judges, who normally sit in benches
of2 or 3.
A historic clash between the legislature of Uttar Pradesh and the judiciary in
that State developed in 1%4. The facts read like a thriller and shook the entire legal
world.
One Keshav Singh (called 'K') published a pamphlet and was reprimanded as
having committed its contempt by the U.P. Legislative Assembly. He wrote a
disrespectful letter to the Speaker of the House and also by his conduct in the House
when he was summoned to receive the aforesaid reprimand, committed a second
contempt, and he was sentenced by the Legislature to 7 days' imprisonment on March
14; 1964.
On March 19, 1964, one Solomon (called'S');
an advocate, moved the High
Court of Uttar Pradesh for a writ of habeas corpus and obtained bail for '!c. The
Spe~er 9f the Assembly, the Chief Minister and the jail superintendent were party
respondents. This order was passed by two judges of the High Court.
The
passed a
(Beg and
and they

Assembly refused to make a return to the notice of the High Court, but
resolution on March 26, 1964 deciding that two judges of the High Court
Sehgal, 11), the advocate and '!c were guilty of contempt of the Assembly
be taken into custody and brought at the Bar of the House. Warrants were
issued against the judges, the advocate and '!c.
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The news was radioed in the evening and the two judges on getting the
information from the broadcast, moved the same High Court of which they were judges
and asked for stay of the warrants. The High Court sat in a Bench of twenty-eight
judges (a wholly unprecedented move) in a united show of strength and passed stay
orders. Similar orders were passed by a Bench of twenty-three judges of the same court
in the case ofthe advocate and '/C. The crisis were nearing boiling point. The Speaker of
the Assembly back-tracked a little by referring the matter to the Privileges Committee
of the Assembly and meanwhile withdrew the earlier warrants. The Privileges
Committee on March 26, 1964 decided to call the two judges, the advocate and '/C
before the Committee to render their explanation and issued notice. Thereupon a
Bench of twenty-three Judges issued an interim order prohibiting the Speaker and the
Privileges Committee from implementing the Resolution and stayed the notice.
The cauldron had now reached boiling point and the crisis was becoming
unmanageable. Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru was the Prime Minister at that time. The'
President of India on March 26, 1964 made a reference to the Supreme Court of India
in its advisory jurisdiction inviting it to give its advisory opinion on certain questions
under Article 143. This gave an opportunity to the Legislature to withdraw its notice
in view of the reference.
The Presidential reference was argued but the Assemhly did not submit to the
Supreme Court's jurisdiction by making it clear that an advisory jurisdiction was not a
judicial function but was merely an opinion like those of law officers.
The Supreme Court, sitting in a Bench of seven judges opined by a majority of
six against one that The legislators had absolute freedom of speech in the House and were not
subject to those restrictions contained in the Chapter on Fundamental
Rights.
That the Privileges of the Assembly were those claimed by the House of
Commons at the commencement of the Indian Constitution (i.e. 26th
Jacuary, 1950) and as recognised by the English courts.
That a law made by the Legislature qua its privileges under Article 194(3)
was subject to Fundamental Rights and would be void if it was inconsistent
with it.
In India, the supremacy is of the Constitution and it is protected by the
authority of an independent judicial body to Act as its interpreter.
'
That if an appplication is made to the High Courts or the Supreme Court
for a writ of habeas corpus the legislature would not be competent to raise a
preliminary objection as to jurisdiction.
That the right of the Legislative Assembly to make rules for regulating its
procedure is expressly made subject to the provisions of the Constitution
[Article 208(1)] and, therefore, such niles would be subject to Fundamental
Rights.
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That in the enforcement of a fundamental right guaranteed to the citizen,
the legal profession plays a vital role and the privileges of the assembly to
punish a citizen or his advocate by general warrant for contempt for such
enforcement is inconsistent with the Constitution.
That the privileges of the Assembly were not subject to fundamental rights
but where there is a conflict between a privilege and a fundamental right,
the conflict has to be resolved by a harmonious construction.
The majority judges of the Supreme Court opined that the two judges were
competent to issue the orders they did, and neither the advocate nor 'K: were guilty of
contempt. They also held that the Legislative Assembly was not competent to direct
production of the two judges, the advocate and 'K: before it for their explanation for
its contempt and equally the Full Bench of the High Court which passed interim
orders was competent to do so.
This decision of the Supreme Court though technically not binding, being
advisory only, galvanised public opinion against the tough stand of the Assembly and
defused the situation while upholding the primacy of judicial review and Fundamental
Rights in a written Constitution.
The sequel is worth noting. The Committee of Privileges of the V.P. Assembly
(which had not submitted to jurisdiction) recorded that the opinion of the majority
judges of the Supreme Court was wrong but "in view of the importance of the
harmonious functioning of the two important organs of the State, the Legislature and
the Judiciary, and the recent judicial pronouncement," the matter was recommended
to be closed by an expression of displeasure. (See Seervai Constitutional Law of India,
Volume II, Third Edition, p. 1844)

8.

The phoney emergency : Attempted review of Keshavananda
Bharati

During the internal Emergency which was declared on June 25, 1975, an attempt
was made by the Government undet its cover, to reopen the famous case of
Keshavananda Bharati (The Fundamental Rights case). As we all know, the
fundamental rights case held that the basic structure of the Constitution could not be
amended by Parliament sitting in its constituent capacity. They pointed out inherent
limitations in this Amendment power, and the .courts claimed the power to declare a
substantive amendment void.
Indira Gandhi had lost her election case in the Allahabad High Court. She
appealed to the Supreme Court, but was able to get only a partial stay in the Supreme
Court (AIR 1975 SC 1590). Internal Emergency was thereupon declared on June 25,
1975. Several constitutional amendments were passed with the entire Opposition in
jail and in record time. By one of the amendments Article 329A was sought to be
introduced attempting to oust the jurisdiction of the court to decide the validity of
Mrs. Gandhi's election.
A Bench of five judges, however, struck down the ouster clause [Article 329A(4)]

as destroying the basic structure of the Constitution (AIR 1975 SC 2299). However,
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the other amendments including the amendment to the election law were upheld, the
effect of which was to set aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court and uphold the
election of Indira Gandhi. This judgment was delivered on Friday, November 7, 1975.
On November 10, 1975 a Bench of thirteen judges (presided over by Chief
Justice Ray) assembled to reconsider the Fundamental Rights case. This was on the
express application of the Central Government. The counsel representing the citizens
strongly opposed the reconsideration. After two days arguments, when the Bench met
on the third day, Chief Justice Ray obviously had lost control of the majority of the
Benc~. It appears that the majority must have been disinclined to reconsider the
Fundamental Rights case. Several Advocate Generals had arrived from the States to
settle down for a long hearing and long stay in the pleasant Delhi winter hoping to
match the hearing of the Fundamental Rights case which went on for a number of
months in 1972 and 1973. On the third day in the morning, Chief Justice Ray led the
Justices in the Court Room and even before the thirteenth judge could take his seat,
he suddenly rose and dissolved the Bench on November 12, 1975. 'This was
unprecedented because no one knows what the order was in the case, except that the
Bench was dissolved. The evening newspapers out with the headlines "Bench
dissolved" and many citizens thought that in the Emergency the Government has
dissolved the Supreme Court.
However, the Fundamental Rights case remained un-impaired.
What was the cause of this sudden 'volte-face' by the court?
In the Press certain exchanges between the members of the Bench and the
Attorney General were reported, the purport of which was that the review apd
overturning of the Fundamental Rights case was sought not because the court by its
decisions had come in the way of socio-economic measures, but the government was
upset at the ouster clause being knocked down by the court the previous week by
following the Fundamental Rights case.
. The background in which the Bench came to be dissolved becomes important.
Parliament was truncated with the entire opposition in detention. There was strict
censorship. All powers were in the government. Constitutional amendments moved in
the morning were passed in the evening without discussion, debate, criticism or
scrutiny. A limited constitutional government as envisaged by our Constitution, was
nowhere in sight but an authoritarian one without any checks or balances was in the
saddle.
It was in this background that counsel for the citizens drew the attention of the
court to a bill called the Constitution (Fortieth Amendment) Bill, 1975, which was
passed in the Rajya Sabha in August, 1975 but was never moved in the Lok Sabha and
never became law. It makes astonishing reading. By an amendment to Article 361 it
was proposed to add sub-clause (2) as under:"No criminal proceedings whatsoever against or concerning a person, who is Qr
has been President or the Prime Minister or the Governor of a State, shall lie in
any Court, or shall be instituted or continued in any Court, in respect of any act.
done by him, whether before he entered upon his office or during his term of
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office as President or Prime Minister or Governor of a State, as the case may be,
and no process whatsoever including process for arrest or imprisonment shall
issue from any Court against such person in respect of any such act."
Immunity from civil proceedings was also sought to be conferred by the otheI
clauses.
Thus, a lifetime immunity was sought to be conferred against criminal offences
'committed during or even before entering upon office by any President, Prime
Minister or Governor. When the terms of this Constitution Amendment Bill wer(
read out to the t~irteen judge Bench, the majority turned against Chief Justice Ray,
One wonders if the constitutional amendment, if passed, would have been valid
under our present law governed as we are by the Fundamental Rights case. But if
there is unlimited power to amend, the Constitution amendment would have been
invulnerable and immunity could be conferred for the most heinous criminal offence.
I have recounted the facts of this case so that it acts as a warning and a beacon to
all lawyers and citizens in our country. Eternal vigilance is the price which we have to
pay to guard our freedom.

* * * *

